In their turnaround strategy, Browns drew on high-end academic research. It paid off.
“It’s academic!” Saying it trivializes academics and their work.
It refers to something that’s relatively meaningless—obvious, unremarkable, not worth discussing, of interest to academics only.
I’ve never spoken the phrase. It’s because I’m fascinated by the academic-real world interface—scholarly practice, I call it—and enjoy connecting academic theory/research to practical matters. Business schools should apply what they teach/research to running school operations, I surmised years ago. Sports organizations should do the same thing.
Take the matter of concussions/CTE in football. One of the first articles I wrote for TSC was about researchers studying why woodpeckers don’t suffer concussions. If we know why they don’t, then we might be able to translate the answer to the human condition.
An example of analytics in baseball (photo, The Atlantic)
Let me be clear. When I say ‘academics,’ I’m not talking about something that’s a craze in sports these days, especially in baseball, that is, analytics (metrics) to guide decision-making.
Analytics of that sort certainly have a place in sports. But what I’m talking about is peer-reviewed academic theory and research, the kind that’s published in scholarly books and journals.
The work being done in one field of study—behavioral economics—is particularly instructive for sports organizations. Behavioral economics analyzes how people and organizations make economic-related decisions. To do that, behavioral economists cast a wide net—going well beyond economics—in seeking to understand why people act as they do. That includes investigating why seemingly rational people make ‘irrational decisions,’ that is, decisions contrary to their economic advantage.
In that regard, I was delighted recently to find a Wall Street Journal article written by Jon Hartley, entitled “Behavioral Economics May Make Champs of the Cleveland Browns.”
Richard Thaler, Univerity of Chicago (photo, Descifrado)
The story starts with an article published in 2013 by Professors Cade Massey (Penn) and Richard Thaler (Chicago), entitled, “The Loser’s Curse: Decision Making and Market Efficiency in the National Football League Draft.”
The co-authors studied NFL draft-day decision making. They concluded that “top draft picks are significantly overvalued in a manner that is inconsistent with rational expectations and efficient markets, and consistent with psychological research.” That’s academic-speak for this: most teams try to win the Super Bowl quickly and—by seeking to win quickly—they tend to make draft decisions that undercut their quest.
Cade Massey. University of Pennsylvania (photo, ESPN)
WSJ’s Hartley gives an example. “A team wanting a second-round pick in a given year’s draft would be willing to give up a first-round pick in the next year’s draft—a very high long-term price. What’s more, the ultimate performance of first-round picks didn’t justify how much teams were willing to give up to get them.”
Here’s the connection to sports and the Browns. Rather than viewing the economists’ research as an academic exercise, the Browns’ front office—led by owner Jimmy Haslam, analytics chief Paul DePodesta, and DePodesta’s staff–sat down with Massey and Thaler. They discussed the economists’ work and, then, talked about how the Browns might use that work to their competitive advantage.
Harley picks up the story from that point. “With a patient long-run goal of ‘winning 100 games in 10 years’—an average seasonal record of 10-6—owner Jimmy Haslam told the front office to follow the strategy of exploiting other teams’ impatience. He understood the Browns would have bad seasons in the short run but would accumulate valuable picks and perform well in the future.”
So the Browns began trading away high draft picks in exchange for stockpiling future picks. In the 2018 NFL Draft, the Browns had five picks in the first and second rounds. Three of those picks came by way of trades. Cleveland selected QB Baker Mayfield with the team’s first pick. The Browns will have twelve picks in the 2019 NFL Draft, seven by way of trades.
The Cleveland Browns, a woeful bunch that went 1-31 in 2016 and 2017, went 7-8-1 in 2018 and almost made the NFL Playoffs. And oddsmaker Jeff Sherman lists the Browns as a 30-1 shot to make Super Bowl 2020–the same odds he accords Houston, Atlanta, and Seattle.
If we take a step back, the Browns did something that’s similar to what, say, engineers do when they design buildings, or what surgeons do to improve surgical practice. Those professionals draw on cutting-edge research. So why don’t we everyday organizations apply the same practice? Most don’t. One reason is executive ego.
Here’s a major league example.
Tesla (left) and Edison (photo, YouTube)
Over a century ago, the otherwise great and self-taught American inventor, Thomas Edison, missed an opportunity to be hailed as the mastermind of the electricity boom. Edison was wedded to Direct Current (DC), which was an impractical approach for providing electrical power to the masses.
One of his employees, Nikola Tesla, a well-educated engineer, saw Alternating Current (AC) as a much better alternative. Tesla recommended it to Edison, but Edison wouldn’t buy it. Tesla left Edison’s company shortly thereafter.
It was Edison’s loss. In what has been called “The War of the Currents”– AC v. DC — AC won. Today, AC is used around the world.
So the next time you hear someone say “It’s academic!” tell them about how the Browns drew on behavioral economics to build their franchise.
Mind you, scholarly practice won’t succeed every time, but it’s the best method I know.
